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ENFORCEMENT OF INSURANCE
CONTRACTS BY OR ON BEHALF OF
THIRD PARTIES
David S Brian
The object Of this article is to ident* and analyse various actions which may assist a third
party who is rehised indemnification by an insurer on the ground that she was not privy to the
contract of insurance.
Enforcement of the contract pursuant to the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 is identijied as the
most appropriate option that is potentially available to a third party. However, in order for the
Act to apply to insurance policies it will be necessary for the Court of Appeal to over-rule or
distinguish a body Of case law on the Act which has arisen from cases concerning nominees.
I INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of "privity of contract" precludes a third party from enforcing a contract
made for his benefit. For example, in the leading case of Tweddle v Atkinsonl the respective
fathers of a bride and groom entered into an agreement to pay specified sums of money to the
groom. The bride's father died without making his agreed payment so the groom sued the
executor for the money. The Court of Queen's Bench shortly disposed of the case on the basis
that a stranger to the consideration cannot take advantage of a contract, even though it was
made for his benefit.
Although Tweddle v Atkinson appears to have been solely decided on the basis that
there was an absence of consideration moving from Tweddle to his father-in-law, later
cases also required that a person seeking to enforce a contract must be a party to the
agreement. That "privity of contract" in fact consists of two discrete common law rules was
confirmed by the House of Lords in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Sel#idge and Co Ltd2
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There is a contrary view, that the requirement that a person must be a party to the agreement
to sue on it is merely an alternative way of stating the consideration requirement, but the
distinction is academic in cases concerning third parties and insurance contracts.
The privity rules are relevant to insurance contracts that purport to cover third parties
as insurers can attempt to deny claims made by such third parties on the basis that they lack
privity. A party to the contract can sue the insurer for breach of contract, but the
traditional view is that the party can only receive nominal damages as it has not suffered
loss. Two cases are used to illustrate the problem and to provide case studies for
discussion purposes.
A Vandepitte
The first case is Vandepitte u Preferred Accident Insurance Corporation of New York, a
Privy Council decision on an appeal from the Supreme Court of Canada. The central issue
was whether a Ms Berry, who had been at fault in an automotive accident while driving
4
her father's car, was covered by her father's motor vehicle policy. The final clause of the
policy stated that certain indemnities provided by the policy would also apply, inter alia, to
any person driving the car for private purposes with the permission of the insured. The
appellant could not argue that Ms Berry had personally contracted with the defendant, but
sought to bring her within the privity rules by arguing that her father had contracted as her
agent or that she was a beneficiary of a trust of the promise. The agency argument was
rejected on the grounds that:
(i) there was no evidence that Ms Berry had any conception that she had entered into a
contract of insurance;
(ii) there was no evidence that the father intended to insure anyone but himself. The
generality of the language alone is not sufficient to establish the requisite intention;
(iii) even if the father had intended to insure on his daughter's behalf, he had no authority
to do so and she did not purport to adopt or ratify the contract;
(iv) as a matter of construction, the clause at issue drew a distinction between "the
insured", being the father, and "any other person or persons"; and
(v) there was no consideration moving from Ms Berry.
3 [1933] AC 70.
4 The current AMP General Insurance (NZ) Ltd Private Type Motor Car Policy provides essentially similar
coverage for third parties, and it will also be referred to in this article as a relevant example of industry
practice.
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With regard to the trust argument the Privy Council affirmed the general rule that a
party to a contract can constitute itself a trustee for a third party of a right under a contract
with the beneficiary being able to sue (joining the trustee as a defendant) if the trustee
refuses to sue on behalf of the beneficiary. This argument too, was rejected on the basis that
there was no evidence that the father intended to create a beneficial interest for his
daughter; the intention must be affirmatively proved and it cannot necessarily be inferred
from the general words of the policy.
B Trident
The operation of the privity rules in cases such as Vandepitte has occasioned much
criticism, both academic and judicial. A different result was reached in the second case,
5
Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Proprietary Ltd, a decision of the High
Court of Australia. Blue Circle Southern Cement Limited had entered into a contract of
insurance with Trident on 13 June 1977. The policy covered, inter alia, public liability at
three construction sites and "the assured" were defined as Blue Circle and all its subsidiary,
associated and related companies, all contractors and sub-contractors and/or suppliers.
McNiece was the principal contractor at one of the sites covered by the policy, but had been
engaged by Blue Circle subsequent to the policy being issued. In July 1979 a Gary Hammond
was seriously injured while driving a crane at the site. He was working under the
direction of a McNiece engineer at the time but his employer was Faro Constructions, a firm
that organised workers for contractors like McNiece. Hammond sued McNiece and was
awarded $541,768, less workers' compensation payments already received. McNiece
sought indemnification under the insurance contract but Trident denied liability on the
ground that McNiece lacked privity.
The keenness of the courts to do "justice" is evident from the decisions at each instance;
all three courts that heard the case found for McNiece, but on different grounds in each case.
In the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Yeldham J held that'
(i) McNiece was in contemplation as one of the assured at the date the policy was
issued;
(ii) consideration was provided by McNiece to Trident because Blue Circle had taken
into account between itself and McNiece "in a financial way" that it had contracted
with Trident ob behalf of McNiece;
5 (1988) 165 CLR 107.
6 Above n 5, 112.
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(iii) it was not established that Blue Circle had actual authority to contract with Trident
on behalf of McNiece, but service of the statement of claim constituted ratification of
the contract by McNiece;
and thus there was an enforceable contract between McNiece and Trident.
The New South Wales Court of Appeal upheld the decision of Yeldham J, but on quite
7
different grounds:
(overturning the basis of the decision of Yeldham J)
• Blue Circle alone was responsible for payment of the premium, so McNiece did not
provide consideration;
• McNiece was not a party to the contract by agency as it was not ascertainable as a
principal when the policy was issued;
• even if Blue Circle intended to act as agent for McNiece, there was no act of McNiece
amounting to ratification;
(upholding the result)
• commercial necessity, practice and wide-spread use have combined to create an
exception to the privity rules in the case of insurance;
• the common law allows a beneficiary specified or referred to in an insurance
contract to sue on that contract.
The Court refused McNiece leave to raise the trust argument, but McHugh JA
nonetheless stated that a trust will invariably be imputed in the case of a liability insurance
policy.
The High Court of Australia also found for McNiece but all seven judges rejected the
suggestion that there was a pre-existing common law exception to the privity rules. Mason
CJ, Wilson and Toohey JJ were, however, prepared to follow the lead of the Court of
Appeal and allow a third party to enforce a contract of insurance provided there was a
contractual intention to benefit the third party. The question of whether the third party
must also establish that she relied on the promise was not however, conclusively resolved.
Mason CJ and Wilson J noted that it was likely that there would be some degree of reliance
by the third party. Toohey J went further and required that the third party must show that
it was likely in the circumstances that she would rely on the promise - this appears to be an
objective rather than a subjective test. The creation of an exception to the privity rules in
the case of an insurance contract was viewed by the three Justices as being a principled
7 (1987) 8 NSWLR 270.
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development of the law. They also thought it would be easy to find a trust on the facts but
acknowledged that trusts can give rise to other problems, not the least of which is that they
can severely circumscribe the freedom of the contracting parties. This problem was
addressed by Mason CJ and Wilson J and their solution was that the rights of third parties
under a contract should be subordinated to those of the contracting parties except insofar
as the third party has relied on the promise to its detriment.
Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ did not accept the'principled development' approach.
Their basic stance was that there could be no exceptions to the privity rule without
formulating a completely new theory of promissory liability to replace the bargain theory.
They were, however, prepared to take a liberal approach to finding a trust in such cases.
Brennan and Dawson JJ would have allowed Trident's appeal, but Deane J would have
stood the case over to allow the trust argument to be addressed. Gaudron J found for
McNiece on the basis of unjust enrichment holding that the right of the third party does not
arise under the contract but nonetheless its right to sue ordinarily corresponds in content
and duration with the obligation under the contract.
Strictly speaking, Trident upholds the privity rules as only three of the seven judges
supported the creation of a common law right for third parties to enforce contracts that are
intended to benefit them. However, the effect of the decision in Australia is to allow third
parties who are purportedly covered by an insurance contract to enforce it if consideration
for the promise has been provided by the promisee.
This article addresses the application of several contract and tort remedies to
Vandepitte and Trident type cases.
II CONTRACTS (PRIVITY) ACT 1982
The Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 abrogates the privity rules by allowing designated
third parties to enforce contractual promises to benefit them, unless the contract does not
intend to give them an enforceable right. The operative provision is s 4:
4. Deeds or contracts for the benefit of third parties -
Where a promise contained in a deed or contract confers, or purports to confer, a benefit on a
person, designated by name, description, or reference to a class, who is not a party to the deed
or contract (whether or not the person is in existence at the time when the deed or contract is
made), the promisor shall be under an obligation, enforceable at the suit of that person, to
perform that promise:
Provided that this section shall not apply to a promise which, on the proper construction of
the deed or contract, is not intended to create, in respect of the benefit, an obligation
enforceable at the suit of that person.
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The operation of the Act has been largely uneventful, with only pre-incorporation
contracts and nominee provisions causing difficulties. Two issues have arisen in the
nominee cases, being the degree of specificity necessary to satisfy the designation
requirement and the need for the benefit to be conferred under the contract containing the
promise, and both issues are relevant to the question of enforcement of insurance contracts
by third parties. In addition, the issue of whether the promise was intended to be
enforceable by the third party also needs to be addressed.
A Designation
In Coldicutt v Webb and Keeys8 Hillyer J accepted both that "nominee" is a designation by
description, and that the only purpose for including the term in the contract was to allow
the nominee to complete the contract. A contrary view was taken by Wylie J in McElwee v
Beer.' He stated that "designated by description" connotes "a person identifiable at the time
of the contract, not someone who by capricious choice of the contracting party may
„10
subsequently be brought within the description .
11
The position of nominees was considered by the Court of Appeal in Field v Alton. The
case concerned the sale of a property to "Brent Paulin or nominee" for $200,000. Two days
after entering into the sale and purchase agreement Paulin entered into an agreement with
Fitton to appoint Fitton as his nominee in return for a payment of $15,000. The Fields made
12
clear that they would only settle with Paulin. They served a settlement notice on his
solicitors, and they cancelled the contract when the notice was not complied with. The
issue was whether a caveat lodged by Fitton should lapse.
Bisson J, who delivered the judgment of the court first discussed the position of Fitton
without reference to the Contracts (Privity) Act. He noted that the Paulin/Fitton agreement
clearly provided that Fitton was to complete the purchase as the nominee of Paulin, and that
a nominee cannot enforce a contract. However, despite the nomenclature used, Bisson J
characterised the transaction as an on-sale as Paulin had assigned his rights under the
original sale and purchase agreement to Fitton. Such an assignment obviates any privity
difficulties and allows the assignee to enforce the contract. Thus if Fitton had complied
with the settlement notice that the Fields had served on Paulin (which had been immediately
8 Unreported, 1 June 1983, High Court, Whangarei Registry, A50/84.
9 Unreported, 19 February 1987, High Court, Auckland Registry, A445/85.
10 Above n 9, 30.
11 [1988] 1 NZLR 482.
12 The Fields were concerned about stamp duty, and thought it would be unlawful to settle the transaction in a
manner that did not disclose the intermediate transaction between Paulin and Field.
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passed on to Fitton) he could have enforced the contract. The court held that the Fields were
entitled to cancel the contract because Fitton had neither submitted a transfer for execution
13
nor tendered the amount due on settlement, and that Fitton's caveatable interest in the land
lapsed upon the Fields exercising their right to cancel the contract.
Bisson J. then considered the argument that Fitton had rights as a third party under ss 4
and 8 of the Contracts (Privity) Act which would support a caveatable interest. He held
that a bare nominee could not satisfy the designation requirement as it could be anyone at
all. To qualify, an unnamed nominee provision would need to be qualified by a descriptive
phrase or classification. A second difficulty identified by the court was that the mere
addition of the words "or nominee" was not sufficient to impute an intention to given an
enforceable right to the nominee. The judgment does not refer to any other cases on the Act
and does not explicitly address the issue of whether the third party must be identifiable at
the time of the contract.
The views of the Court of Appeal are naturally of great importance but, with respect, the
discussion of the Act in Field was unnecessary as the finding that Fitton could enforce the
sale and purchase agreement as assignee meant that the Act could not improve his position.
14
Accordingly, the Court's comments could be viewed as obiter.
The cases identify a continuum along which the designation requirement must be placed.
At one end is the ability to be able to identify each third party at the date of the contract
(McElwee) and at the other end is the situation where identity of a third party is only
relevant at the time it seeks to enforce the promise (Coldicutt). The exact position of Field on
the continuum is not clear, but it appears to represent an intermediate position between the
other two cases.
It is appropriate to consider the legislative history and the effect of the different
interpretations when considering how broadly the designation requirement should be read.
15
The Act implemented the report of the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee,
and the Committee's approach is consistent with Coldicutt (or vice versa): the report
concluded that "... it should not be a requirement that beneficiaries be identified or in
„ 16
existence at the time of contract .
13 Fitton had argued that he was not required to submit a transfer or tender the amount due because the Fields
had made it clear that they would not convey the property to Fitton. This argument was rejected by the court
on the facts.
14 But I note that Chilwell J in Karanga/tape Road International Village Ltd v Holloway [1989] 1 NZLR 83 was of the
view that he was bound by the Court of Appeal decision in Field.
15 Privity # Contract, Presented to the Hon Minister of Justice on 29 May 1981.
16 Above n 15, para 8.2.3.
660 (1996) 26 VUWLR
A requirement that third parties be identifiable at the time the contract is entered into
would produce capricious results. For example, a bill of lading contains an exclusion
clause for damage to goods and the exclusion is stated to extend to the employees of the
carrier. Jack is an employee as at the date the parties contract, but Jill is taken on as an
employee on the following day. The result would be that Jack but not Jill could enforce the
exclusion clause.
The Minister of Justice (the Hon JK McLay) twice referred to the facts of Vandepitte in
the course of introducing the Contracts (Privity) Bill in the House, and on the second
occasion he left no doubt that the proposed Act was intended to apply to Vandepitte
17
cases:
Let us have a quick look at the two cases I mentioned in my introductory remarks, just on
which side common sense falls. The first one related to an insurance company that refused to
pay damages arising out of a car accident when a young woman was driving that car because
the policy that normally covered such damage was held by her father. Recovery was refused,
on the grounds that there was no privity of contract between the daughter and the insurance
company. Well, good old insurance companies accept all risk and resist all claims. I wonder
whether the Member for Island Bay really believes that the application of the rule of privity of
contract makes sense, because I do not - and that is why the Bill is being introduced today.
This again supports the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee/Coldicutt
approach as, like with the case of a nominee, an authorised driver of another's car could be
anyone, an exchange student from Africa who holds an international drivers licence for
instance. It is not until such a person is given permission that her identity is known, so it is
not possible for the parties to know the identity of all such drivers at the time of the
contract.
Nine submissions on the Bill were made to the Statutes Revision Committee. Eight of
them generally supported the Bill, with the only exception being the submission made by the
18
Insurance Council of New Zealand. The Insurance Council did not accept the need for
reform, but if the Bill was to proceed it submitted that it should only apply in respect of
insurance policies to persons named in the policy or, at most, to persons who are members of
a class that is clearly defined in the policy. The submission that reform was not needed was
given a short shrift, with the Justice Department report on the Bill noting both the
conservatism of the insurance industry and the fact that it has often benefitted from the
17 (1982) 443 NZPD 156.
18 Submissions of the Insurance Council of New Zealand on the Contracts (Privity) Bill, 28 May 1982,
SR/82/386.
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privity rules.19 With regard to the submission that the Bill should be confined to named
individuals or clearly defined classes for the purposes of insurance policies, the Report
stated that an amendment would be proposed to clause 4 to clarify that it would only apply
to beneficiaries specified individually or as a class and that this should meet the Insurance
Council's concern. It further noted that insurers could limit the coverage afforded or
purportedly afforded by their policies and stated that if they accept a broadly drawn
policy, and the premium, they should be obliged to perform their side of the bargain.
However, the Bill as reported back from the Statutes Revision Committee (and as
subsequently enacted) may have "over-clarified" the designation requirement. The amended
20
clause 4 is reproduced below:
4. Deeds or contracts for the benefit of third parties-
Where a promise contained in a deed or contract confers, or purports to confer, a benefit on a
person, designated by name, description, or reference to a class, who is not a party to the deed
or contract (whether or not the person is (identlfied or) in existence at the time when the deed
or contract is made), the promisor shall be under an obligation, enforceable at the suit of that
person, to perform that promise:
Struck Out
(2) This section does not apply to a promise which, on the proper construction of the
deed or contract, is not intended to create an obligation enforceable at the suit of that
person.
New
Provided that this section shall not apply to a promise which, on the proper construction of
the deed or contract, is not intended to create, in respect of the benefit, an obligation
enforceable at the suit of that person.
The critical change is the deletion of the words "identified or" from the fourth line. On
its own it undermines the argument that the Act is meant to apply to third parties who
cannot be identified at the time of the contract, such as casual drivers of motor vehicles and
contractors who are engaged subsequent to the policy being taken out. But it can be argued
that they were deleted because of fears that the original wording would allow enforcement
by third parties who were not intended to have that right and that the insertion of the
19 Contracts (Privity) Bill 1982, Report of the Department of Justice, 10 November 1982.
20 Words struck out are shown in italics within bold round brackets, or with black rule at beginning and after
last line; words inserted are shown in roman underlined with a double rule, or with double rule before first line
and after last line.
662 (1996) 26 VUWLR
words "designated by name, description, or reference to class", were intended to have the
same general effect as the deleted words in respect of third parties who were intended to
have enforceable rights. This is consistent with the comments made by the Minister of Justice
21
when moving that the Bill be read a second time:
The main concern expressed by all those who made submissions was that, in making the
changes proposed, the Bill should not inadvertently extend rights to third parties who would
benefit under contracts but who were clearly beyond the contemplation of the contracting
parties at the time the contracts were made, and who were not intended to be given
enforceable rights under those contracts ... Accordingly, changes have been made to clause 4
to ensure that that it is unlikely to happen.
The argument is further supported by the non-deletion of the words "whether or not the
person is in existence at the time when the deed or contract is made". You cannot identify
what does not exist, but you can tell whether it comes within a designated description or
class when it comes into existence. It is also pertinent that the Statutes Revision Committee
did not insert "who is identifiable at the time the deed or contract is made" or similar, which
would be expected if it had decided to make such a radical change to the clause. Another
example of the arbitrary results that could arise otherwise can be given with reference to
the Trident facts - McNiece Bros Pty Ltd would not be able to enforce the contract under the
22
Act if it had been incorporated prior to the policy being taken out, but if it was
incorporated subsequently it would be able to use the Act.
Logically, the designation issue should be resolved in favour of either the Coldicutt or
the McElwee approach. The Court of Appeal in Field did not clearly define its stance and it
could either be the same as that of Wylie J in McElwee, in which case it does not present a
third option, or it could require a more precise description of the class of third parties
without requiring that they be identifiable at the time of contract. If the latter, the Court of
Appeal would appear to be placing an unnecessary gloss on the statutory test which would
only require that the contract purport to confer a benefit on a third party who comes within
a class or description and who can be identified at the time it wishes to enforce the benefit.
The concern of the Court of Appeal as to the specificity of the designation or description
should properly be addressed when the court considers the question of whether, on the
proper construction of the contract it is intended to create an enforceable obligation; a very
broad or designation or description may indicate that an enforceable obligation is not
intended.
21 (1982) 449 NZPD 5114.
22 The Acts Interpretation Act 1924 defines "person" to include a company unless inconsistent with the context of
the Act, and there is no suggestion that the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 applies only to natural persons.
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This issue obviously requires determination by the Court of Appeal in a fully argued
case. The possible outcomes are considered below.
First, the court could uphold McElwee and rule that the Act is only available to third
parties who can be identified at the time of the contract. This would preclude most if not
all, third parties from relying on a Vandepitte/AMP contract. The caveat is because the
court could hold that immediate family members residing with the insured are identifiable
due to the high level of foreseeability that they will both use the car and rely on the policy.
Third parties under a Trident contract would be covered unless, like McNiece Bros, they
were engaged subsequent to the time of the contract (but then if they were not in
23
existence/incorporated at that time they may also be covered).
Second, it could affirm what appears to be the Field position and hold that a third party
need not be identifiable at the time of the contract but must nonetheless be described or
classified with greater particularity than just "nominee" or similar. The fate of third party
drivers is not clear under this scenario, but it is possible that the court would take
cognizance of the fact that third party drivers of a private car would almost invariably
have a pre-existing relationship with the insureand thus hold that this nexus provides
sufficient particularity for the Act to apply. The Trident third parties would all
comfortably satisfy the test as the policy was limited to parties with links to Blue Circle
and specified construction contracts and specified sites.
The third scenario is for the court to resile from the position it took in Field, whatever
precisely that was, and uphold the Coldicutt approach. This would be the best outcome for
third parties under insurance contracts. It would also accord most closely with the scheme
and the purpose of the Act. The ease with which Field could be ignored will depend upon
whether its discussion of the Act was obiter, as I suggested previously, or was part of the
ratio of the case. If the former, a court at any level could do the deed, but otherwise a nel
of five Court of Appeal judges is required to overturn a previous decision of that court.
B Benefit Conferred by the Contract
26
Several High Court decisions have held that the Act also does not apply to nominees
because the benefit is not conferred by the contract the nominee is seeking to enforce, being
the sale and purchase agreement, but rather it is conferred by the party that nominates it. It
23 See above n 22.
24 This would allow it to distinguish Field which appears to have been a "flick-on" sale by a party to the contract
to an unrelated third party.
25 [1987] 2 NZLR 145.
26 McElwee, Brown v Healy Unreported, 25 July 1988, High Court, Auckland Registry, A147/84.
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is suggested by the Law Commission that the same argument could apply in cases where the
third party is chosen by one of the contracting parties subsequent to the time of the contract.
It gives as an example an exclusion clause which is expressed to be for the benefit of
independent contractors who do work for one of the parties, and notes that it could be
27
argued that the benefit is conferred by the party who appoints the contractor.
If correct, it would deny coverage to third parties such as McNiece Bros under Trident
contracts. It could also deny coverage to third party drivers on the basis that the benefit is
conferred by the insured when she gives the third party permission to drive the vehicle.
With respect the argument appears to be based on an unduly narrow view of the section
as the nomination of itself is useless without the sale and purchase agreement. It is odd that
a statutory reform which is intended to liberalise the law of contract is interpreted in such
a way as to frustrate the apparent intention of the parties to confer a right of enforcement
on a third party.
It is possible that the Court of Appeal will take a different view, but otherwise it is
highly likely that other contracts such as those purporting to afford insurance cover to
third parties will be distinguished. Insurance contracts of the kinds discussed in this paper
can be materially distinguished from nominee cases on at least two different bases. The first
is that the sole purpose of the nomination is to allow the nominee access to the benefit of the
"primary" contract being the sale and purchase agreement. But in Trident and Vandepitte
cases access to the benefit of the insurance contract is incidental to the engagement of the
contractor or the driving of the car and each activity has a purpose independent of the
existence of the insurance contract. The second basis for distinguishing is that an "or
nominee" contract is an either or affair; only the party or the nominee can take the benefit of
the primary contract. The insurance contracts purport from the outset to cover the insured
and the third parties.
C Intention to Create an Enforceable Obligation
The proviso to s 4 excludes from its operation "... a promise which, on the proper
construction of the deed or contract is not intended to create, in respect of the benefit, an
obligation enforceable at the suit of that person". Hence there is no need for the contract to
state that a third party can enforce it, but a statement to the contrary would obviously be
fatal to a third party action.
This issue was touched on by the Minister of Justice when moving that the Bill be read a
second time. He referred to the fact that it is patently inappropriate to extend enforcement
rights to third parties in respect of certain types of contracts and gave as examples contracts
27 New Zealand Law Commission Contract Statutes Review - Report No. 25 (Wellington, 1993) 224.
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for the bulk supply of municipal services such as electricity or water to consumers, noting
that it would be both highly inconvenient and contrary to the parties' intentions to allow
consumers to sue on such contracts. Insurance contracts are far removed from the types of
contract referred to by the Minister; the insured deliberately seeks third party coverage, the
insurer issues a policy on that basis and calculates the premium accordingly, and the
promise is to provide a direct benefit to the third party. These circumstances, together with
the almost universal practice of insurers to indemnify third parties in respect of valid
claims, should satisfy the intention criterion in all but the most exceptional of cases.
D Summary
The case-law on the Act potentially poses an obstacle for third parties seeking to use it
in order to enforce an insurance contract. However, the genesis of the case-law has been
claims, not always overly-meritorious, by nominees and this appears to have influenced the
courts' approach to the "designation" and "benefit conferred by the contract" issues. In the
case of insurance contracts, the proper construction of the contract will ordinarily support
a finding that it intended to create an enforceable obligation at the suit of the third party
and this should influence the courts to take a more liberal approach in respect of such
contracts. The more likely scenario is that insurance contracts will be distinguished from
the nominee cases, but it is also possible that the Court of Appeal will over-rule its own
decision in Field and take a more liberal approach generally.
III TORT
The possibility of a third party suing the insurer for negligent misstatement and/or for
28
breach of a duty of care of the type recognised by the House of Lords in White v Jones are
examined under this heading.
A Negligent Misstatement
To succeed in a negligent misstatement action the third party must establish that the
insurer owed it a duty of care, that the duty was breached by the insurer making a negligent
misstatement, that the third party relied on the misstatement, and that the third party
suffered economic loss as a result of that reliance.
With regard to the duty of care issue, our Court of Appeal and the House of Lords have
diverged in respect of the approach to be taken to determine whether a duty of care is owed
in any given situation. The Court of Appeal has basically stuck with the two step approach
29
first used in Anns v Merton London Borough Council whereas the House of Lords has
2 8 [1995] 1 All ER 691.
2 9 [19771 2 All ER 492.
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resiled from that position, preferring instead the incremental approach adopted in cases
31such as Caparo Industries plc v Dickman and Murphy v Brentwood District Council.
A five member Court of Appeal considered the different approaches in South Pacific
32
Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants and Investigations Ltd. Their
Honours concluded that New Zealand should retain the two step approach as it has been
employed for some time without apparent dissatisfaction, and the same considerations are
addressed under each approach.
But even if the same considerations are addressed under each approach, they do not
necessarily produce the same result. The difference is highlighted by the leading cases on
33
negligent misstatement. In Scott Group Ltd v McFarlane the Court of Appeal (Woodhouse
& Cooke JJ) held that the auditors of a public company's accounts owed a duty of care to a
person who relied on the company's accounts when making a take-over offer for the
company in circumstances where there was a plain risk of a take-over being attempted and
it was virtually certain that the accounts would be relied upon by the offeror. Richmond P
dissented, being of the view that:34
... it does not seem reasonable to attribute an assumption of responsibility unless the maker of
the statement ought in all the circumstances, both in preparing himself for what he said and
in saying it to have directed his mind, and to have been able to direct his mind, to some
particular and specific purpose for which he was aware that his advice or information would
be relied on. In many situations that purpose will be obvious. But the annual accounts of a
company can be relied on in all sorts of ways and for many purposes.
Caparo also concerned a take-over made in reliance on the audited accounts of the target
company. The plaintiff claimed that the auditors owed a duty of care to investors and
potential investors. It also alleged that the auditors ought to have foreseen that the target
was vulnerable to a take-over bid and that the bidder would rely on the accounts for that
purpose. The House of Lords held that the criteria for imposing a duty of care in pure
economic loss cases not involving a fiduciary or a contractual relationship are
foreseeability of damage, proximity of relationship, and public policy considerations. The
35
proximity criterion was described in very similar terms to those of Richmond P above, and
30 [1990] 1 All ER 568.
31 [1990] 2 All ER 908.
32 [1992] 2 NZLR 282.
33 [1978] 1 NZLR 553.
3 4 Above n 33,566.
35 The passage is cited with approval by Lord Bridge at 578 - 579 and Lord Oliver at 594 - 595 and 598.
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the following excerpt from the judgment of Lord Oliver succinctly summarises why the
House of Lords came to a different conclusion from the Court of Appeal in respect of an
36
almost identical fact situation to that of Scott Group:
To widen the scope of the duty to include loss caused to an individual by reliance on the
accounts for a purpose for which they were not supplied and were not intended would be to
extend it beyond the limits which are so far deducible from the decisions of this House. It is
not, as I think, an extension which either logic requires or policy dictates and I, for my part,
am not prepared to follow the majority of the [English] Court of Appeal in making it.
Caparo limits proximity in negligent misstatement cases to circumstances in which advice
is tendered or a statement is made in respect of a particular transaction or type of
transaction and the advisor or maker of the statement knows or ought to know that it will
likely be relied upon by a particular person or class of persons for that purpose. It is
interesting to note that four of the five judges in South Pacific refer to Caparo but not Scott
Group. The exception is Cooke P, a member of the Court in Scott Group, who refers to that
case but ignores Caparo.
In both the Vandepitte and Trident circumstances the policy itself would be the statement
at issue. In terms of Caparo the statement is made in respect of a particular type of
transaction, being indemnity insurance in respect of specified risks. The insurer would
presumably have knowledge, actual or inferred, that the policy would be relied upon for
that purpose by a particular class of persons, being third parties purportedly covered by
the policy. This would be particularly so in the Trident circumstances as the nature of the
undertaking and its associated risks would make it highly likely that sub-contractors
would address the issue of insurance.
The Vandepitte situation is more problematic as it can reasonably be postulated that
many people do not turn their mind to the question of whether there is insurance when they
drive another's car. Secondly, of those that do so, many would not know the specific terms
of the policy and/or the identity of the insurer. Given that the proximity test for negligent
misstatement is primarily designed to preclude unlimited liability, this purpose would not be
undermined by reading the "likely to be relied on" criterion liberally in Vandepitte
circumstances as the economic loss flows from the use of the vehicle and so the insurer can
only be potentially liable in respect of one driver at any time. Furthermore, one major
accident would effectively bring the policy to an end as the vehicle would no longer be
operative. This is quite different from the Caparo scenario, which could give rise to
thousands of claims in respect of the one statement. Lastly, actual reliance will still need to
be proved by a plaintiff in order to succeed with a claim.
36 Above n 30, 601.
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With regard to the need for the statement to be made to the third party, it is not necessary
that there be any direct contact between the parties. It is sufficient that the insurer knew
that the insured would pass the information on to members of an identifiable class who
would rely upon it for a specific purpose.
The final consideration is whether it is reasonable to impose a duty of care. In the
writer's view it is that insurers acting in the course of their business and receiving
premiums for doing so should be responsible for the correctness of statements made in their
policies.
The circumstances are such that a duty of care is likely to be found in terms of the
English approach. Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that a duty of care would also be
found to exist under the more liberal New Zealand approach.
The next hurdle for the third party plaintiff is establishing that the insurer breached the
duty of care by making a negligent misstatement. The orthodox view is that only negligent
misstatements of fact or negligent advice are relevant, and that statements of intention are
37
not relevant. However, the Court of Appeal in Meates u Attorney-General held that a
statement of future intention can be actionable if it was meant to be acted on and the maker
of the statement was in an exclusive position to give effect to it. This extension was not
38
well received by the Privy Council in Meates v Westpac Banking Corporation Ltd with
their Lordships expressing difficulty with the concept that a person should take reasonable
care to fulfil a non-binding promise. The learned authors of The Law of Torts in New
39
Zealand suggest that the extension more properly comes within promiss047 estoppel as it
has been developed in Australia by Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher.
In brief, the Vandepitte policy stated that certain indemnities would also be available to
third persons riding in or driving the car, with the permission of the insured or of an adult
member of his family, in the same manner and under the same conditions as applied to the
41
insured. The AMP policy provides that the insurer will indemnify any person driving
any vehicle specified in the policy schedule, and the Trident policy simply defined "The
Assured" as being "Blue Circle Southern Cement Limited, ... all Contractors and Sub-
Contractors ...".
37 [1983] NZLR 309.
3 8 Unreported, 5 June 1990, PC 43/89. The comments were obiter dictum only.
39 SMDTodd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1991) 154.
4 0 (1988) 164 CLR 387.
41 Above n 4.
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In all three cases it can be argued that the policy conveys an intention by the insurer to
indemnify certain third parties, the language of the policy indicates that the intention was
meant to be acted on, and the insurer was in an exclusive position to give effect to that
intention by indemnifying the third party.
Unless the High Court distinguishes Meates on the facts, this argument should be upheld
at that level. Its fate in the Court of Appeal would be less certain. It was invited to
42
overrule Meates in Shing v Ashcroft, but declined to do so because of a lack of prior
notice and because the Court did not consider it essential to the argument.
The third parties can also argue that the respective clauses convey the impression that
they have enforceable rights under the contract. This argument does not rely on Meates, and
the statement is arguably made negligently as insurers are generally large corporates which
should know the correct position regarding the standing of third parties under insurance
contracts. The argument is strongest under the Trident policy as it included various classes
of third parties within its definition of "The Assured". The other two policies clearly
distinguish between the assured and others purportedly covered, but the impression in each
case is strengthened by the surrounding wording. The Vandepitte policy provided that the
indemnity was payable first in respect of any claim of the insured's, with any amount of the
cover not so paid being available for third party claims. This reinforces the impression that
the third party had rights, albeit inferior to those of the insured. The AMP policy reinforces
the impression by providing that the third party's coverage was dependent inter alia, on her
observing, fulfilling and being subject to the terms of the policy insofar as they could apply
to her.
As noted previously, proving reliance on the statement could well be a problem for
casual users of a private motor vehicle. If the insured does not pass the information on to
the third party then that should be the end of the matter. But what if the insured tells the
third party that the policy covers her, but does not disclose the identity of the insurer?
43
Harris and another v Wyre Forest District Council and another is authority for the
proposition that the identity of the alleged tortfeasor is not always necessary. The House
of Lords held that the second respondent, a valuer, was liable in respect of his negligently
prepared valuation report even though his identity and the report were not disclosed to the
plaintiffs. It was sufficient that the plaintiffs knew that the valuation report would have
been prepared, and that the Council would not have lent them money if the report was not
satisfactory. This approach should be taken in insurance cases if it is found that a duty of
42 Above n 25.
4 3 [1989] 2 All ER 514.
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care exists as it would otherwise make liability in respect of statements made with the
knowledge that they would be relied upon dependent upon a caprice.
The major difficulty for Vandepitte third parties would be convincing the court that they
would otherwise have not driven the vehicle or that they would have taken out their own
insurance policy had they known that the purported coverage was subject to the decision of
the insurer as to whether it would in fact honour the policy. An added complication is the
fact that insurers almost invariably do pay out, so it would not be a stark choice between
coverage and non-coverage, but between guaranteed coverage and almost guaranteed
coverage.
The same comments generally apply to Trident third parties, but given the risks and
commercial nature of the undertaking they would be better placed to convince the court that
nothing less than guaranteed coverage would be acceptable to them.
Under either type of policy, establishing loss should not be a problem if the reliance
criterion is satisfied.
B White v Jones
44
By a 3:2 majority the House of Lords in White v fones held that a firm of solicitors
which had negligently failed to draw up and have executed a new will prior to the death of
the testator was liable in tort to the intended beneficiaries for the amounts they would have
45
received under the proposed will. The duty owed by the solicitors to the intended
beneficiaries shadowed the duty owed by the solicitors to the testator.
The features of the case which led the majority (Lords Goff, Browne-Wilkinson, and
Nolan) to find a duty of care were that the solicitors could reasonably foresee that their
negligence in performing a task that they voluntarily undertook to complete may deprive the
intended beneficiaries of their inheritance in circumstances where neither the testator nor
the estate have a remedy because they have suffered no loss. Reference was also made to the
role of solicitors in society, with it being important that they be accountable, and to the
importance of legacies as a means of improving the lot of recipients and of allowing a
testator to dispose of her property as she sees fit. The majority saw the duty as being
46
consistent with, or an extension of, existing principle. The minority (Lords Keith and
44 Above n 28.
45 This duty of care was recognised by the Court of Appeal in Gartside v Sh*-eld, Young & Ellis [1983] NZLR
137. The material facts of each case are the same, but the two courts took different paths to the same result.
46 Lord Goff saw the case as coming under the Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] AC 465 principle, and Lord Nolan
saw it as coming within the criteria laid down in Caparo (above n 30) and Murphy (above n 31). Lord Browne-
Wilkinson viewed the case as an extension of the Hedley Byrne principle.
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Mustill) were of the view that finding a duty of care would represent a departure from,
rather than a principled development of, decided cases.
The extension/departure was necessary for the plaintiffs to succeed as the case
contained a number of features that militated against the finding of a duty of care on
traditional grounds: the solicitors were guilty of an omission rather than an action, the loss
was of an expectation, and the plaintiffs had not acted in reliance on the solicitors carrying
out the instructions.
While acknowledging that there are similarities between White v Jones and the case of a
third party under an insurance contract - the insurer can reasonably foresee economic
damage to the third party if the insurer refuses indemnity, no remedy may be available, and
insurance and the role of insurers are also very important to society - the writer is of the
view that this does not constitute a breach of the duty of care identified in White v Jones.
The duty, arguably, owed by the insurer to the third party is to write a policy of insurance
that satisfies the insured's requirements, which can be taken to include the requirement that
designated third parties also be €¥ectively insured. However, the policy is "negligent" not
because of any act or omission by the insurer, but because of the operation of the privity
and damages rules. The third party can obtain the right to enforce the policy in contract by
being joined as a party to the contract and by providing consideration to the insurer, but
then you have a quite different contract. Also, this solution is simply not feasible for third
parties such as a one time driver of an insured's car. It is therefore submitted that a duty is
not breached by writing a standard insurance policy that does not/cannot provide
enforcement rights in contract for third parties covered by it.
A more appropriate action in tort for a disappointed third party is, as is discussed
under the immediately preceding heading, that of negligent misstatement. White v Jones
strengthens this argument as it extends the boundaries for economic loss cases and thereby
strengthens the third party's claim - the positions of the intended beneficiary under the will
and the third party under the insurance contract vis-a-vis the solicitor and the insurer are
comparable as the solicitor and insurer are each aware that their actions will affect the
financial well-being of the beneficiary and the third party, but the third party will also
often be able to demonstrate reliance and detriment.
A final point to note is that the majority in White v Jones recognised a duty of care in
part because the intended beneficiaries would not otherwise have a means of redress. This
factor will not be present in the insurance situation if the third party has another remedy,
such as enforcement of the contract pursuant to the Contracts (Privity) Act, available to her.
IV LINDEN GARDENS
The fundamental problem with insurance contracts that cover third parties is that the
doctrine of privity precludes the third party from suing under the contract for damages if the
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insurer refuses to honour her valid claim, and the insured can only receive nominal damages
on the contract in respect of that breach as she personally has suffered no loss. This
unsatisfactory state of affairs has been remedied by the House of Lords, albeit in relation to
a quite different type of contract, in Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals
47
Ltd.
The essential facts of each case are as follows. Linden Gardens was the assignee of a
leasehold interest in several floors of a commercial building. There was an existing but as
yet unknown breach of an asbestos removal contract at the time of the assignment. The
contract was between the assignor and the contractor. Clause 17 of the contract prohibited
its assignment without the written consent of the other party, but the assignor had
nonetheless purported to assign the benefit of the contract to Linden Gardens. The assignor
had received market value for asbestos-free premises so suffered no loss in respect of the
breach. Accordingly, it was not a party to the proceedings.
St Martin's Property Corp began a property development which was to include shops,
offices, and flats. It entered into a building contract with the defendant, the contract
containing an assignment clause practically identical to the one in Linden Gardens. For tax
reasons Property Corp assigned all its interest in the property to an associated company, St
Martin's Investments Ltd. It also purported to assign the benefit of the building contract to
Investments, but again the consent of the contractor had not been sought or obtained. There
were no subsisting relevant breaches of the building contract at the time of the assignment,
but there was subsequently a problem with a leaking podium deck. Remedial work costing
£800,000 plus VAT was carried out and this was originally paid for by Corporation,
which then recovered the amount from Investments. Unlike the situation with Linden
Gardens, the assignor (Corporation) was a party to the proceedings along with Investments
even though it had not suffered any loss as a result of the contractor's breach.
The House of Lords held that the attempted assignments of contractual rights in breach
of the contractual prohibitions were ineffective. This determined the Linden Gardens
appeal in favour of the contractor as the only plaintiff, being Linden Gardens, therefore
lacked privity and so had no cause of action in contract. The position was different in the
St Martin's appeal as the assignor and the assignee were both plaintiffs, and the ruling that
the assignment of contractual rights had been ineffective meant that Corporation remained a
party to the building contract.
The defendant did not dispute that Corporation was entitled to damages, but submitted
that it could only receive nominal damages as it had parted with its interest in the property
4 7 [1993] 3 All ER 417. Two consolidated appeals were heard, the other being St Martin's Property Corp Ltd v Sir
Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd.
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prior to the occurrence of the breach and, further, it had received full value for its
assignment to Investments. The Court of Appeal had avoided this result on the basis that
Corporation was liable to Investments for breach of contract in failing to effectively assign
the benefit of the building contract to Investments. The court held that the measure of
damages for this breach was the cost of remedying the leaking podium deck as Investments
could have recovered that amount from the defendant if the assignment of contractual rights
had been effective. The defendant accepted that Corporation was liable in contract to
Investments, but argued that the damage claimed was too remote. This argument was
accepted by the House: "One party to a contract cannot be liable for damages flowin from
the doing of an act by the other party which the contract itself expressly forbids". The
House did, however, uphold the award of substantial damages to Corporation on a
different basis.
The principal speech was given by Lord Browne-Wilkinson who held that the case fell
49
within the rationale of the rule in Dunlop v Lambert. That case held that a consignor of
goods could recover substantial damages for the failure of the carrier to deliver the goods
even though the consignor had parted with the property in the goods prior to the breach.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson adopted the formulation of the case's rationale as given by Lord
50
Diplock in The Albazero:
The only way in which I find it possible to rationalise the rule in Dunlop v Lambert so that it
may fit into the pattern of the English law is to treat it as an application of the principle,
accepted also in relation to policies of insurance on goods, that in a commercial contract
concerning goods where it is in the contemplation of the parties that the proprietary interests
in the goods may be transferred from one owner to another after the contract has been
entered into and before the breach which causes loss or damage to the goods, an original party
to the contract, if such be the intention of them both, is to be treated in law as having entered
into the contract for the benefit of all persons who have or may acquire an interest in the
goods before they are lost or damaged, and is entitled to recover by way of damages for breach
of contract the actual loss sustained by those for whose benefit the contract is entered into.
Applying the rationale to the facts of the St Martin's case, Lord Browne-Wilkinson
observed that: the contract was for a large development and both parties knew that it
would be occupied, and possibly purchased, by third parties; it could therefore be foreseen
that damage causedby a breach would also cause loss to a later owner; rights would not
automatically vest in the occupier or owner for the time being who sustained the loss. His
48 Above n 47,433 (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
49 (1839) 6 Cl & F 600, 7 ER 824.
5 0 [1976] 3 All ER 129, 136-137.
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Lordship was of the view that it was appropriate on those facts to treat the parties as
having entered into the building contract on the basis that Corporation would be able to
enforce it for third parties who suffered from defective performance but who could not
51
acquire rights to personally enforce the contract:
It is truly a case in which the rule provides"a remedy where no other would be available to a
person sustaining loss which under a rational legal system ought to be compensated by the
person who has caused it".
Lords Keith, Bridge, and Ackner dismissed the contractor's appeal in St Martin's for the
reasons given in the speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson. Lord Griffiths agreed with the
result but preferred to base his judgment on a broader ground. This broader ground is
detailed later in this article.
With regard to the case itself, had the same facts arisen in New Zealand the assignee
would almost certainly have based its claim in tort as the New Zealand courts have taken a
more liberal approach than their English counterparts with regard to finding a duty of care
in negligence cases. The need to recognise this new cause of action can therefore be viewed
52
as a direct result of the Murphy v Brentwood District Council decision.
A second point concerns the parameters of the decision. Dunlop v Lambert concerned the
carriage of goods and St Martin's extends it to construction contracts, but can it also apply
to insurance contracts? If the decision is truly based on Dunlop v Lambert it would seem
that the answer is "no". Lord Diplock's formulation of the rationale of that case, referred to
previously, limits it to cases where there has been a transfer of the proprietary interest. A
third party under an insurance contract is not a transferee. This conclusion is inferentially
supported by the judgments of Lords Goff and Mustill in White v Jones. Lord Goff refers to
St Martin's as a "transferred loss case", an expression not found in any of the judgments in
the case itself, and notes that the plaintiffs in White v Jones would have difficulty bringing
themselves within the exception as they were seeking to recover damages for a loss that the
contracting party (the testator) could not himself have suffered. He did not, however,
completely rule out the possibility that St Martin's could be successfully invoked by the
contracting party in a case involving a loss that could only fall on the third party. Lord
Mustill also refers to "transferred loss" although interestingly he is hesitant to include St
Martin's as a transferred loss case. But he does place greater weight on the fact that only
the third party could suffer the loss at issue to exclude a contract solution in White v Jones.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson studiously avoids all mention of St Martin's in his judgment, and
Lords Keith and Nolan are also silent on the subject.
51 Above n 47, 437. The quote within the quote is from Lord Diplock, above n 50, 137.
5 2 [1991] 1 AC 398.
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The position of a third party under an insurance contract is, however, analogous to that
of Investments with regard to the foreseeability of loss to it if the contract is breached by the
insurer and the fact that it cannot hold the insurer liable for the breach in contract.
Accordingly, ignoring for the moment the immediately preceding discussion on the nature of
the loss and the need for a transfer, the insurance contract could also be categorised as a
proper case in which to treat the parties as having entered into the contract on the basis
that the promisee could enforce the contract for the benefit of the third party. This approach
does not appear to be too far removed from finding a constructive trust. And if a case comes
within this category, why should it matter whether the type of foreseeable loss arising as a
direct consequence of a breach of contract is one that could be suffered indifferently by a
party or a third party to the contract, or whether there has been a transfer of property? In
either situation both the justification for allowing the party to enforce on behalf of the third
party is the same, and the loss is suffered by the third party and not the party. The
restrictions may have more to do with caution than with consistency.
A more radical solution to the problem faced by Investments was favoured by Lord
Griffiths. He was prepared to hold that the measure of damages available to a party to a
contract in respect of a breach should be the cost of securing performance of her bargain.
This approach does not require the party to show loss in the traditional sense, rather she
has a recoverable loss because she did not get what she paid for. This approach would
obviously assist a disappointed third party under an insurance contract. Lord Browne-
Wilkinson also considered this approach and viewed it favourably, but he preferred to
decide the case on the narrower ground on the basis that the ramifications of the more
53
general approach should be explored before it is adopted:
There is therefore much to be said for drawing a distinction between cases where the
ownership of goods or property is relevant to prove that the plaintiff has suffered loss through
the breach of a contract other than a contract to supply those goods or property and the
measure of damages in a supply contract where the contractual obligation itself requires the
provision of those goods or services. I am reluctant to express a concluded view on this point
since it may have profound effects on commercial contracts which effects were not fully
explored in argument. In my view the point merits exposure to academic consideration
before it is decided by this House. Nor do I find it necessary to decide the point since, on any
view, the facts of this case bring it within the class of exceptions to the general rule to which
Lord Diplock referred in The Albazero.
Lord Keith expressed sympathy with the broader approach and Lord Bridge stated that
he was attracted to it, but each of them agreed that the appeal should be dismissed on the
53 Above n 47,435.
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narrower ground. Lord Ackner concurred with the decision without reference to either
ground.
The narrower ground adopted by the House does not offer too much hope for a third
party insured but the broader ground would certainly assist, particularly if it is developed
so as to allow the third party to compel the insured to enforce the contract. A clearer
picture will no doubt emerge when the ambit of the case is defined in future judgments. With
regard to St Martin's reception by the New Zealand judiciary, the only reported reference to
54
the case is by Richardson J in Invercargill City Council v Hamlin, which involved a
negligence claim by a house owner against the Council in respect of its inspection of the
house's foundations. His Honour suggested that a cautious stance be taken in respect of the
55
radical approach:
In [St Martin's] Lord Wilkinson-Browne at p.112 noted that the radical approach might have
profound effects on commercial contracts and invited academic consideration. As only one
aspect of the wider question of risk allocation under building control regimes and having
regard to the current position in this country, any move down that path would require a
wide-ranging analysis and assessment of all the economic and social implications.
One of the issues that will need to be resolved if only the narrow approach from St
Martin's is adopted is the question of over-lapping remedies. Lord Browne-Wilkinson's
judgment states that the assignor's right to substantial damages is dependent upon there
being no remedy available to the party that suffers the loss, but it is not clear as to whether
he is referring to no contractual remedy being available or no remedy of any nature being
available. If the former then New Zealand parties in the position of St Martin's could elect
to pursue an action in tort or in contract, but otherwise they will be forced to rely on a
negligence claim only.
The final point to note under this heading is that the approach taken by the Court of
Appeal in St Martin's to damages does not involve any radical departure from the
traditional view of the law, and thus should be upheld by the New Zealand courts in
appropriate cases. For example, if Blue Circle was to provide insurance cover as part of its
contract with McNiece Bros or if it had stated that cover was provided then it would be
liable to McNiece Bros in contract or tort if Trident refused to indemnify McNiece Bros.
The refusal by Trident would be in breach of its contract with Blue Circle and Blue Circle
could recover substantial damages in respect of the breach because its loss, being the amount
of damages it would be required to pay to McNiece Bros, would be reasonably foreseeable
to Trident.
54 [1994] 3 NZLR 513, 529.
55 Above n 54.
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V CONCLUSION
Several possible remedies available to a third party who is refused indemnity by an
insurer have been canvassed in this article. In the writer's view the most appropriate
solution is provided by the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982. The wording of that Act appears
to encompass promises to benefit third parties so, unlike the other options, there shouM be
no need to stretch or even distort an existing remedy in order to assist a third party. Second,
enforcement of the contract will result in the third party receiving precisely the amount
promised under the contract - this avoids uncertainty as to the amount that may be
recovered which may arise with other remedies. Third, the Act also caters for associated
matters such as variation or discharge of the contract by the parties, enforcement by the
third party, and defences available to the insurer. With other possible remedies these
matters may need to be worked out by the courts. A fourth benefit for third parties is that
they do not need to prove reliance on the promise in order to enforce it. Reliance is a
requirement under tort remedies and it could prove to be a stumbling block, particularly in
the case of occasional third party drivers seeking to enforce a motor vehicle insurance
policy. The non-requirement of reliance is balanced by the proviso to s 4 which provides
that the Act does not apply to a promise which, on the proper construction of the contract is
not intended to be enforceable by the third party. It is the writer's opinion that the possible
difficulties arising from the case-law on nominee contracts will be overcome by the Court of
Appeal either over-ruling its decision in Field or, the more likely scenario, by distinguishing
insurance contract cases.
Of the other remedies the "radical" approach to contract damages advocated by Lord
Griffiths in Linden Gardens could also assist greatly, particularly as neither reliance by the
third party nor an intention by the promisor to give rights to the third party appear
necessary, but matters such as whether the third party can compel the promisee to bring a
breach of contract action have yet to be determined. Negligent misstatement may be
available to third parties who can establish sufficient proximity, but the cost of such an
action would make it a viable option only if a large amount of money was at stake.
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